

# YOUTH, VIOLENCE AND DRUG TRAFFICKING IN RIO DE JANEIRO

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CNPq/ FINEP  
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# Rio de Janeiro


- ◆ Former capital of Brazil from 1688 to 1960.
- ◆ Accelerated and disordered urbanization without economic development during 20th Century.
- ◆ Crime growth from the 1970s onwards.
- ◆ Less city growth: 2% in 1980; 0.4% in 2000 Census.
- ◆ Favelas continue to grow: 2.4% in 2000
- ◆ The city had 5,857,904 inhabitants, of which 1,094,922 lived in subnormal urban agglomerations in 2000.

- Rio de Janeiro is divided into five major Planning Areas (AP) and subdivided in 11 AP, as well as 32 Administrative Regions (RA).
- Impoverishment of the suburbs (AP3) since the 1970s. De-industrialization, economic losses in the service sectors and discontinued anti-poverty programs focused on the *favelas* provoked a drop in family income and urban degradation.
- Poor districts of the city (AP1, AP3 and AP5): few socio-economic differences between *favela* and asphalt dwellers; It is difficult to mark the boundaries between *favelas* and the adjacent regular districts, although there are islands of affluence in some of them.
- The opposite is true in the richest zones of the city (AP2 and AP4): shantytowns detached from their surroundings form islands of poverty inside rich environments, presenting face-to-face the sharp contrasts of inequality in Brazil.
- AP3 is the area with a greater population density (116/ha) five times greater than that registered for the recently populated AP4 (23/ha) and AP5 (26/ha), the only areas that have grown in the last five years (almost 10% in AP4 and 7.61% in AP5).

# Poverty and inequality in favelas


- ◆ the proportions of dark skinned and white people in *favelas* are the opposite of the regular city: in *favelas* 58.6% are blacks and browns and 41.4% white, whereas respectively 36.5% and 63,5% of them live outside *favelas*;
- ◆ 50% of *favela* dwellers are less than 25 years old as compared to 37,7% of those living in regular districts;
- ◆ 60% of families with less than 2 Min Sal headed by women;
- ◆ illiterates in *favelas* were 10%, while 3% outside;
- ◆ proportion of people inside *favelas* with less than 8 years of schooling: 82% but only 46% of dwellers in regular districts.
- ◆ 94% of children in *favelas* attend school but have a comparatively poorer performance: 20% of them are more than two years behind compared to only 10% of the students outside *favelas*;
- ◆ sharper contrast between the average income of favelados (US\$208) and non-favelados (US\$1180) in AP2 and AP4, than inside the poorer zones (AP3 and AP5): US\$ 175 for favelados and US\$ 285 for non-favelados

# Coefficient of mortality by homicides (/100.000) – Brazil, 1991 – 2000



Source: Waiselfisz, J. Mapa da Violência III - os jovens do Brasil. UNESCO, 2002


# Coefficient of mortality by guns (/100.000) according to sex. Brazil, 1991 - 2000



Source: Sistema de Informação sobre Mortalidade (SIM) / Ministério da Saúde, Brasil

# The richest, the most violent region of Brazil: the Southeast

## homicide rates in 4 Capital cities




Fonte: DATASUS, Ministério da Saúde, Governo Federal

## **Main forms of victimization in the city: relatives, friends and neighbours murdered**

- ◆ 5,4% of people with 15 years-old and more had relatives murdered; 5,8% lost friends; 4,7% lost neighbours in the last 12 months.
- ◆ The distribution of losses among 15 year-old people and more in Rio de Janeiro is not homogeneous.
- ◆ Proportion of neighbours murdered more correlated with the housing area.
- ◆ Proportion of friends murdered more correlated with age.
- ◆ Proportion of relatives murdered more correlated with family income.




# Greater percentages of people with small family income that had relatives murdered in the previous 12 months




Fonte: Pesquisa Vitimização NUPEVI 2005-2006 município Rio de Janeiro

# Younger people have percentages ten to six times larger than older ones



Fonte: Pesquisa Vitimização NUPEVI 2005-2006 município Rio de Janeiro

**Percentages of people that had neighbours killed:  
0% in AP4, 0,5% in AP 2.1, 12 times greater in  
AP2.2, AP3.1, AP3.2, AP5.2 and AP5.3 (areas with  
favelas controlled by traffickers or militias)**




## Forms of private security

- ◆ lack of policing, police corruption and violence led to an “endless war”, as neighbours call it, which puts those who live in poor areas between two opposing armed conflicts: the war between bandits of different “commandos”; the war between policemen and bandits, not always to repress crime and to abide to the law.
- ◆ 25% of the people interviewed admitted having some kind of private security.
- ◆ Variations: paid or unpaid traffickers, paid or unpaid neighbors; informal vigilantes; security enterprise employees in uniform; employees without uniforms; militia or extermination groups

## Noise of gun firing and crimes heard or seen in the city

- firing is more heard than seen the noise (and the fear it produces) is not evenly distributed between neighbourhoods, even the poor ones. The richest planning areas (AP 2.1 and 4) are the ones where firing is much less heard. Some of the poorest (AP 1, 3 and 5.2), where trafficking gangs dominate most of the favelas, are the ones with most of the firing. AP 5.1, where many military personnel live, and 5.3, where paramilitary groups controls the territory instead of trafficking gangs, present the lower proportions of firing as well.


# Favelas controlled by traffickers or militias: gun firing heard



Fonte: Pesquisa Vitimização NUPEVI 2007 favelas do Rio de Janeiro


# Excessive force used by PMs five times greater in favelas

**Percentual dos entrevistados moradores e não moradores em favelas que viram policiais atirando sem provocação na sua vizinhança (últimos 12 meses)**



# Excessive force used by PMs - firing without provocation in their neighbourhoods (by Area of Planning last 12 months)


Percentuais dos moradores do Município do Rio de Janeiro que viram policiais atirando em suas vizinhanças, por Áreas de Planejamento






# Assaults more common in favelas controlled by militias


Percentuais de homens e mulheres agredidos na vida toda em favelas dominadas por traficantes ou por milícias




# Listening gun fire by AP/ militia in 2006




# See or listen to crimes by APs/ militia in 2006




# Sociability and trust amongst neighbours by APs/ militias in 2006







# Distribution of homicides by the victims' address in 2005



# Gun controlled favelas by commands of traffickers or militias in 2005




# Gun controlled favelas by commands of traffickers or militias in 2006







# Gun controlled favelas by commands of traffickers or militias in 2007




# Gun controlled favelas by commands of traffickers or militias in 2008



## Porcentages of the dominated favelas areas by traffickers' commandos or militias



## Porcentages of dominated favelas by traffickers' commandos or militias



## Historical global contexts: Effects of State action on drug traffic

- ◆ Organized Crime threatens the organization, governance and the monopoly of legitimate violence.
- ◆ More threats where institutional governance is weak and inconsistent: corruption, irreverence towards law, inefficiency in the justice system, inadequate public policies for prevention and treatment.
- ◆ Increased violence creates insecurity and further burden the costs of the health and security systems. Less money for other important policies in the fight against poverty, such as education.

## Political institutional context in Brazil: Contradictions of democratization

- ◆ The process of re-democratization in 1978 was accompanied by a spectacular increase of violent crime, particularly homicide among young men.
- ◆ A nation built by the ideals of cordiality and conciliation, with tolerance of racial, ethnic and religious, strengthened the mechanisms of personal revenge and uncontrollable aggression.
- ◆ In the re-democratization process, neither forgiveness nor peace between opposed groups discussed publicly at the end of the military government.
- ◆ Re-democratization remains incomplete or split. Not many changes in the Military Police to control excessive use of force, or access to guns exclusive to Brazilian Armed Forces. Repressive disruption of popular organizations. Effects on neighbourhoods?

## **Repression against prohibited drugs stimulates crime**

- ◆ Prohibited economic activity, crime not consensually defined, brings new actors interested in maintaining the status quo because of the advantages they get.
- ◆ The illusion of the "easy money" attracts poor young people for criminal gangs but enriches other characters unpunished and rich: recipients of stolen goods, wholesale traffickers, smugglers of guns, corrupt policemen, the paramilitary.
- ◆ Civil and Military Police make incursions in slums and poor neighborhoods. But corrupt policemen supply the weapons to the arsenal of traffickers inside favelas and are not investigated
- ◆ Poor and black youth who have been arrested as traffickers increase prison population, making the criminal justice system in the country unjust, rising revolt and the option for deviant behavior.

# **Money, weapons and men in drug traffic: ecology of danger**

- ◆ Possession of firearms explained by the logic of war: competitors become mortal enemies that need to be discouraged by a progressive increase of guns and men.
- ◆ This logic contaminate youths. Peer groups are the biggest predictor of delinquency among young men, particularly homicide by gun.
- ◆ Youths use guns to avoid being victimized by their armed peers, to gain respect and to enjoy the prestige associated with possession of guns.
- ◆ Large quantity of guns available to youths in very crowded areas, brought by corrupt policemen and gun traffickers. Ideas and postures of cruelty and insensitivity towards others' suffering expand.

# Money, weapons and men in drug traffic: hyper masculinity

- ◆ Many styles of masculinity among migrants from other states, among young people of the second generation, among young whites, blacks and mulattos from Rio.
- ◆ In hyper masculinity, conspicuous consume defines the new successful masculine identities. Helping friends, neighbors and relatives, impressing everyone with a display of jewelry and expensive clothes on one's body, giving parties and beverages in public places.
- ◆ Exacerbated masculinity style or the spectacular display of male protest: context of a localized but endless armed conflict, and a lot of money in your pocket. Youths become a threat to their neighborhoods.