
In and Around:



In and Around: Examining Attractors and Generators of Theft on the London Underground

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Glossary/Scope

- **‘Theft’** of personal property
 - *pick-pocketing/pocket-picking*
 - *NOT robbery /violent offences*
- **Public Transport (PT)**
 - Mass/Rapid Transit Systems
- **Case Study - London Underground (LU)**
- **Methodology - Interstitial Crime Analysis (ICA)**
- **Crime Attractors and Generators (Brantingham(s))**
 - NOT attractors/generators of passengers (transport planners)
- **Data**
 - British Transport Police (BTP)
 - London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

Aims

- **Aim:** Examine **theft** on **underground** transport systems
- Q1: Is there a transmission of risk between ‘**above**’ and ‘**below**’ ground settings?
- Q2: What factors ‘**in**’ and ‘**around**’ stations may act as crime attractors or crime generators?
- To test this: **Interstitial Crime Analysis (ICA)**

Mechanisms for Theft on PT

- **bring together mix of persons:** different backgrounds/demographics (Brantingham, 1991)
- users **constantly interchange** (Richards and Hoel, 1980);
- passengers **unfamiliar** with areas and susceptible to victimisation (Block and Block, 2000; Piza, 2003)
- passengers **easy targets**, eg tired, carrying accessible items, pre-occupied, or distracted travelling with young children (Mhyre and Rosso, 1996)

Mechanisms for Theft on PT

- stations provide **easy and rapid entry and exit** points for offenders (Block and Block, 2000; Loukaitou-Sideris et al, 2002)
- offenders **linger** at stations for long time periods **without** arising **suspicion** (Block and Davis, 1996; Piza, 2003)
- **Crowded conditions** offer **anonymity** to offenders (Loukaitou-Sideris et al, 2002)
- certain degree of **jostling** or bumping might even be **expected** (Herrmann, 2012)

Transmission of 'theft' risk?

- ***Transit environs***
 - Is there transmission of risk?
- 1. Crime at transport nodes **related** to surrounding areas
 - *Block and Block (2000); Loukatiou-Sideris, 2002 ;Bernasco and Block 2009; Cecatto (2011)*
- 2. Good design **insulate** stations from surrounding areas
 - *Clarke, 2006; La Vigne 2007*
- **Spatial Interplay** (Robinson and Giordani 2011)
- **Radiators and Absorbers** (*Bowers 2013*)

Context: Theft on LU

- **5,063** thefts on LU (financial year 2011/2012)
 - 4 thefts per million passenger journeys
 - **50%** all crime on LU versus **27%** all rail crimes in Eng and Wales
 - **40%** all theft person on UK rail: = on LU
- Research Literature
 - (i) '**risky-facilities**' (80/20 rule) and (ii) '**peak times**'
- BUT Problems with estimating **LOCATION** and **TIME**?
 - Limited victim knowledge about when/where offence occurred
 - end of line recording (75% LU thefts)
 - based on "*known station*" thefts (less than 25% thefts)
- How examine theft on journeys? **ICA**

Public Transport and Crime Events: The crime analysis matrix

Crime event	Precise time	Time frame
Static	Point Pattern Analysis	Aoristic Analysis
Transient / Dynamic	Hot Lines	Interstitial Crime Analysis (ICA)

Newton et al, in press:

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Why Interstitial?


- *Interstitial Spaces*
 - Chicago School (alternative name for Zone of Transition)
 - Felson – Crime and Nature
 - Interstitial spaces (gap between, no real ownership)
- Ratcliffe – *Aoristic Crime Analysis*
 - Burglary – “temporal uncertainty”
- ICA - spatial and temporal uncertainty
 - Interstice- “*is an empty space or gap between spaces full of structure or matter*”

ICA: How does it work?



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
Theft 1>

Theft 2>


Theft 3>

Theft 4>


Andy Gill and Henry Partridge Transport for London



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

ICA: Results





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ICA scores (counts)



ICA adj* scores (rates)



0 10 20 30 40 Kilometers


A horizontal scale bar with a black outline. It is divided into four equal segments by vertical tick marks. Below the bar, the numbers '0', '10', '20', '30', and '40' are placed at the corresponding tick marks. The word 'Kilometers' is written at the far right end of the bar.


Time of Day and ICA


- Transient System; Dynamic; Time of Day Important
- Previous work – **theft higher at peak times**
- 6 time periods: Standardised rates
 - per hour of time category
 - and passenger counts (hourly available)
- Early (02.00-06:59) AM peak (07.00-09:59)
- Inter-peak (10.00-15:59) PM peak (16.00-18:59)
- Evening (19.00-21:59) Late (22.00-01:59)





ICA adj* by time of day















Public Transport Settings



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ICA: Above and Below

- A1 :Theft MPS (above)
- A2 : British Transport Police (BTP) (above)
- B1 and B2: ICA adj* (below) – BTP (below)
- Tested relationship between above and below
 - Compare 4 models
 - End of Line and ICA models (counts and rates)
- ICA adj* model most appropriate
- +ve **correlations** theft at and above, not other crime
- **strongest** at peak time, little or no correlation off peak

— Newton et al, in press:

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In and Around: Attractors and Generators



- **Q2: In and Around** – What factors influence theft
- Settings: A1, A2, B1, B2
- Internal features?
- External characteristics?
 - Cecatto (2011), Bernasco and Block (2009)



In and Around: Attractors and Generators?

- Internal Design

- No gates and ticket machines;
- lifts and escalators, surface and sub surface platforms,
- Amenities – cash machines; shop + kiosk rentals
- Waiting rooms
- Surface and sub-surface platforms
- Theft<250m or 'at' station

- **Not** CCTV/Staffing* - to add

- External Characteristics

- domestic and non domestic dwelling,
- railways, paths, and green space,
- population density, house prices, welfare benefits, and school truancy
- Crime rates
- Index of Multiple Deprivation

In and Around: Attractors and Generators

- Negative Binomial Regression
 - Model 1* –internal only
 - Model 2* –external only
 - Model 3* - internal and external predictors
 - 44 variables reduced to 25* (first round *simulation*)
- Based on ICA
 - Offset variable – population (passenger per million)
- * preliminary findings as previous model OLS regression

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Above ground theft (<250m)	XX		XX
At station theft (above)	X		XX
Above ground shoplifting (<250m)	X		
At station shoplifting (above)	X		
Number waiting rooms	X		XX
Number surface platforms	XX		XX
Number subsurface platforms	X		XX
Number ticket machines	XX		
Number Cash Machines			XX
% domestic buildings		XX	XX
% roads		XX	XX
% paths		XX	XX
Index Multiple Deprivation		X	
% unauthorized school abs			XX

** 99%

* 95%

red-negative

blue-positive

In and Around: Attractors and Generators



- Predictor variables
- Mix of internal and external
 - Accessibility
 - external -% of roads/paths versus Internal -number platforms
 - Nearby crime
 - internal <250m versus external -ward level no impact – removed
 - Features/Land Use/Design
 - internal waiting rooms versus internal cash points
 - external % domestic buildings and external % truancy

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Implications

- Appears to be factors both internal and external drive crime
- Transmission of risk:
 - **above** and **below**
 - **in** and **around**
- Evidence of spatial interplay/transmission of risk
- Predictor variables: inside station and external environs

Interpretations

- Hypothesis: Theft on Underground
 - ‘uni-nodal’ offenders –operate at only one station
 - ‘multi-nodal’ offenders –operate between stations
 - system causes of theft – busy stations – generate/attract thefts
- Q: Same offenders above or below?
- Q: Or use system to identify opportunities – *theft scripts*?
- Q: Station attractor/generator
- Q: Nearby land use attractor/generator

Limitations

- Influence of spatial lag?
- Time of day: Peak v Non Peak
 - Weekend v Weekday
 - Schools v School Holidays
- Can we identify sub types of station Clarke and Eck (2003)
 - Difference in top 20 ICA and ICA adj*
 - Crime **generators**: having **high count** of crime but a **low rate** per population
 - Crime **attractors** as experiencing a **high volume** and **high rate** of crime

Next Steps: Attractors and Generators



- Devised 6 typology of stations
 - **Type I:** High risk of theft: counts only: All times (**generator?**)
 - **Type II:** High risk of theft: rates only: All times
 - **Type III:** High risk of theft: counts and rates: All times (**attractor?**)
 - **Type IV:** Intermittent high risk of theft: some times
 - **Type V:** Intermittent medium risk of theft: some times
 - **Type VI:** Low risk: all times (control)
-
- Next step – run model against these? Any differences?

