Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI)
Introduction to IEMI
“[IEMI is] the intentional malicious generation of electromagnetic energy introducing noise or signals into electrical and/or electronic systems, thus disrupting, confusing or damaging these systems for terrorist or criminal [malicious] purposes."
Electromagnetic sabotage, or Intentional Electromagnetic Interference, (IEMI) is the intentional malicious use of different electromagnetic sources to induced interference (or permanent damage) in the victim system.
First, it should be mentioned that very severe incidents, with a large loss of life, money, property or public relations have occurred due to unintentional electromagnetic interference and been described in literature (e.g., see IEC 61000-1-5).
Due to the military heritage from the cold war and the research that grew out of the experience with electromagnetic effects on systems from nuclear explosions in the atmosphere (so called NEMP) and High-Power Microwaves (HPM), much of the past research has focused on the effects of electromagnetic energy on military systems (such as aircraft, ships, communication systems or munitions).
However as of the late 1990’s, the focus has to some extent shifted. This shift in research is much due to the huge increase in the amount of sensitive and sophisticated electronic systems (often commercial-off-the-shelf, COTS) being used in critical civil infrastructure components and everyday systems today. With the increased miniaturization these systems become inherently more vulnerable to disturbances.
Thus, it is important to investigate and mitigate the threat to different civil systems from IEMI by traditional EMC methods and praxis in the light of a human intent behind the disturbance.
IEMI research typically includes subjects such as:
• Coupling of electromagnetic fields into systems (either directly through a partially shielded exterior or dielectric) or onto cables.
• Immunity levels of these and the underlying process for different upset events seen ("why did it fail?").
• Adaption of existing EMC methods for, e.g., protection against high frequency or wideband disturbances or unorhodox coupling paths.
• System level threat analysis to judge the level of protection needed ("financial cost vs. risk and system criticality").
"Unorthodox coupling paths, source technology, waveforms, etc. must be considered for IEMI, when performing an EMC investigation and mitigation."
Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI), High Power Electromagnetic (HPEM), High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP), Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (NEMP), Electromagnetic terrorism, Ultra Wide Band (UWB) interference, field coupling.
Daniel Månsson, "SafePowNet - Undersökning av sårbarheten hos elkraftnät mot avsiktliga EM-störningar (IEMI)", Electronic Environment 2011, April 2011
Daniel Månsson, "Att störa den störare som stör", Electronic Environment 2011, April 2011
Daniel Månsson, "Jamming Jammers Jamming GSM Phones", ANTEM/AMEREM - 2010 14th International Symposium on Antenna Technology and Applied Electromagnetics (ANTEM) & the American Electromagnetics Conference (AMEREM), Ottawa, Canada, 2010, August 2010
Daniel Månsson, Mats Bäckström, Rajeev Thottappillil, "Intentional EMI against Critical Infrastructures, a Discussion on Mitigation Philosophy", 2010 Asia-Pacific International Symposium & Exhibition on Electromagnetic Compatibility in Beijing, January 2010
Daniel Månsson, Rajeev Thottappillil, Mats Bäckström, Methodology for Classifying Facilities With Respect to Intentional EMI, IEEE Trans. On Electromagnetic Compatibility, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 46-52, Feb 2009.
Raul Montaño, Mats Bäckström, Daniel Månsson, Rajeev Thottappillil, "On the Response and Immunity of Critical Infrastructures Against IEMI – Current Swedish Research Initiatives", Paper 245, 19th International Zurich Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Singapore, May 19 - 22, 2008.
Daniel Månsson, Rajeev Thottappillil, Mats Bäckström, "Propagation Ability of UWB Transients through Junctions of Low-voltage Power Installation Cable", Paper 96, 19th International Zurich Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Singapore, May 19 - 22, 2008.
Rajeev Thottappillil, Daniel Månsson, Mats Bäckström, "Response of Electrified Railway Facilities to Intentional Electromagnetic Interference: Review of Research at Uppsala University", Paper 105, 19th International Zurich Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Singapore, May 19 - 22, 2008.
Raul Montaño, Mats Bäckström, Daniel Månsson, Rajeev Thottappillil, "Response and Immunity of Electric Power Infrastructure Against IEMI – Ongoing Swedish Initiatives", RVK08, Växjö, June 9-11, 2008.
Rajeev Thottappillil, Daniel Månsson, Mats Bäckström,"Susceptibility of Electrified Railway Facilities to Intentional Electromagnetic Interference", RVK08, Växjö, June 9-11, 2008.
Daniel Månsson, Olof Lundén, Rajeev Thottappillil and Mats Bäckström, The scenario of intentionally radiated electromagnetic interference to railway systems, Proceeding of the EMC Europe Workshop 2007, June 14 - 16, 2007, Paris.
D. Månsson and R. Thottappillil, The Threat of Conducted High Power Electromagnetic Pulses in Civilian Facilities, Proceeding's of the E3 2007 (EMC, ESD och Elsäkerhet) conference, 17- 18 April, 2007, Gothenburg, Sweden.
Daniel Månsson, Tony Nilsson, Rajeev Thottappillil and Mats Bäckström, Susceptibility of GPS Receivers and Wireless Cameras to a single Radiated UWB Pulse, Proceedings of EMC Europe, Barcelona, Spain (2006).
Rajeev Thottappillil, Daniel Månsson, Nelson Theethayi, Mats Bäckström, Tony Nilsson, Göran Undén, Barbro Nordström, Per Bohlin, Per Anders Lindeberg, Ulf Hellström, Peter Lindeberg, Georg Bohlin, Mihael Zitnik, Lise Ekenberg, Response of Civilian Facilities to Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI), with Emphasis on the Swedish Railway Network, EMC Europe Workshop, Rome, Sept. 19-21, 2005.
Thottappillil, R., R. Montano, and D. Månsson, Response of Surge Protective Devices to Very Fast Transient Conducted Pulses (Abstract), Euro Electromagnetics (EUROEM), Magdeburg, Germany, 2004.
Daniel Månsson, Rajeev Thottappillil and Mats Bäckström, Propagation of UWB Transients in Low-Voltage Power Installation Networks, IEEE Transactions On Electromagnetic Compatibility, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 619-629, August 2008.
Månsson, D.; Thottappillil, R.; Nilsson, T.; LundÉn, O.; BÄckstrÖm, M., Susceptibility of Civilian GPS Receivers to Electromagnetic Radiation, IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 434-437, May 2008.
Månsson, D.; Thottappillil, R.; Bäckström, M.; Lundén, O., Vulnerability of European Rail Traffic Management System to Radiated Intentional EMI", IEEE Transactions On Electromagnetic Compatibility, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 101-109, Feb. 2008.
Daniel Månsson, Tony Nilsson, Rajeev Thottappillil, and Mats Bäckström, Propagation of UWB Transients in Low-voltage Installation Power Cables, IEEE Trans. EMC., Vol. 49, No. 3, Aug. 2007.
D. Månsson and R. Thottappillil “Comments on "Linear and Nonlinear Filters Suppressing UWB Pulses””, IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat., Vol. 47, No. 3, 671-672, August 2005.