The government has recently decided to launch an inquiry into developing a more appropriate organisational structure for state universities and colleges. This is a positive step. It is an important investigation and a critical issue for higher education institutions.

Although this investigation was announced in the research bill, it was subsequently voted down in committee. However, the government can independently decide which investigations to carry out, and the investigation is now underway despite parliamentary opposition.

The investigation actually has two parts, both of which are based on independence.
Firstly, academic freedom involves the freedom to choose, publish and shape research methods. This freedom is enshrined in law, as is academic freedom as a general guiding principle. The latter has been included in the Higher Education Act for several years.

Secondly, autonomy is largely built through the institutional autonomy of higher education institutions. A high degree of institutional autonomy is achieved by giving universities greater control over their own activities. This, in turn, means less detailed government control. Institutional autonomy includes self-determination with regard to boards and the appointment of rectors, as well as an absence of detailed reporting requirements, assignments or targets imposed by the state relating to anything other than core activities. It has to do with autonomy: the ability to act freely within the innovation system, and greater freedom in terms of international and national collaborations.

True autonomy also requires control over financial conditions. The long-term funding model does not necessarily have to cost the state more, but it must provide greater opportunities to shape activities based on the needs of higher education institutions. This could be achieved through properly funded foundations and by altering the current allocation of state funds to foster security, long-term planning and sustainability.

A high degree of institutional autonomy could also mean giving higher education institutions decisive influence over premises provision. This could be achieved either by the institutions owning the properties themselves or by foundations linked to the institutions. This would enable a move away from the current model of premises provision, which is often criticised for the costs imposed on institutions by high return requirements.

However, great freedom comes with great responsibility. The question is how the state, and ultimately taxpayers, can exercise control to ensure the quality of, and the importance of, higher education institutions for broader social development. One way to move forward on this would be to revisit the proposals of the so-called Strut Inquiry (In Swedish) on agreements or long-term contracts. The aim would be to create better dialogue and more institution-specific governance based on long-term conditions, whereby institutions and the state could agree on how each institution could best contribute to societal development.

As usual, however, the investigator should not make proposals regarding resource allocation. Thus, the question of how any foundations might be financed should also fall outside the scope of the investigation. Nevertheless, I hope that such discussions can be held in connection with the investigation.

In any case, KTH University Director Kerstin Jacobsson is a very competent and skilled investigator who has been assigned to the case. I look forward to following this interesting and operationally critical investigation.